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Abstract 
In order to assess the feasibility of ALPR technology in Canada, a pilot project using the 
technology was conducted in Surrey, British Columbia, Canada in 2006.  As part of this 
larger pilot project, one unmarked police vehicle equipped with ALPR technology was 
deployed to a number of major parking lots in Surrey.  The purpose of this current study 
was to examine the data from this one car to analyze the quantity, quality, and location of 
„hits‟ to determine whether it was a viable and useful strategy to deploy ALPR-enabled 
police vehicles to parking lots.  Given the proportion of „hits‟ in parking lots, it is 
recommended that ALPR not be deployed to parking lots alone.  While there may be a 
benefit to deploying ALPR-enabled vehicles to parking lots between 3 p.m. and 7 p.m., it 
would appear that the technology might be more useful along high traffic corridors. 
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Introduction 
 
 Auto theft is a serious problem throughout the Lower Mainland of British 
Columbia. In 2003, in British Columbia, approximately 40,000 cars and trucks were 
stolen; 30,000 of which were stolen from the Greater Vancouver Region (IMPACT, 
2005). In Surrey, B.C. alone which has been described as the auto theft capital of the 
world (McLaren, 2004), there were 6,338 auto thefts in 2005 (IMPACT, 2005).  While 
the increase in Surrey was only 1%, over the same time period, the Greater Vancouver 
Region saw a 10% reduction in auto and truck thefts (IMPACT, 2005).  Needless to say 
both police agencies and ICBC have been anxious to find approaches which will help 
reduce this problem (Miller Interview, 2006). 
 Two of the main explanations offered for the large number of auto thefts are the 
relationship between drug use and car theft and the role that cars play in the commission 
of other crimes, such as break and enter and other property crimes. In fact, there is some 
indication to support a direct connection between these two explanations. Specifically, 
drug addicts, especially those using methamphetamine, frequently steal cars and trucks in 
order to facilitate the commission of other crimes or to obtain money or goods for the 
purpose of acquiring more drugs (IMPACT, 2005). In the Fraser Valley, in particular, 
pick-up trucks are apparently very popular with car thieves because they are effective for 
driving through road blocks and transporting stolen goods (Miller Interview, 2006).  
One of the innovative approaches introduced in British Columbia to combat the 
problem of auto theft is the BAIT Car program. The BAIT car program places cars with 
hidden video cameras, GPS technology, and kill switches in car theft „hot spots‟ both as a 
  
deterrent and as a way to catch and convict car thieves. While this program has met with 
some success, many communities in the Lower Mainland are victims of repeat BAIT car 
thieves (Miller Interview, 2006). For example, in Abbotsford, a car thief was recently 
caught stealing their third BAIT car (Miller Interview, 2006). Clearly, the BAIT car 
program alone will not resolve the auto theft problem. Other innovative initiatives are 
also required if British Columbia is to significantly reduce the number of cars stolen in 
the province. 
 One such innovative technology is Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR). 
While the way in which this technology works will be discussed in greater detail below, 
ALPR technology photographs up to 3,600 license plates per hour (Pughe, 2006) of 
moving or stationary vehicles without human intervention and compares the 
photographed license plate to a number of police and insurance company databases to 
determine whether the car is uninsured or stolen, or whether the owner of the vehicle is 
an unlicensed or a prohibited driver. Theoretically, this technology should assist police in 
uncovering stolen vehicles, thus contributing to the recovery of stolen vehicles and the 
apprehension of car thieves. In addition to its potential benefits with respect to stolen 
vehicles, due to its ability to search license plates against police and insurance company 
databases, this new technology may also be a useful mobile apprehension tool to locate 
uninsured or unlicensed vehicles and prohibited drivers. 
 The general purpose of this major paper is to analyze the feasibility of ALPR in 
Surrey, British Columbia, specifically its deployment in parking lots. While this 
technology was tested with five unmarked RCMP police cruisers in Surrey, this study 
focuses on the data collected from one of the unmarked cars which patrolled major 
  
parking lots in Surrey. Given this, the specific issues to be considered in this major paper 
are: (1) the effectiveness of this technology; (2) how ALPR can be most efficiently 
deployed; and (3) its viability as a crime prevention strategy.  
The potential benefits of ALPR seem clear. For example, if the technology 
operates as intended, it would allow a mobile police cruiser to examine hundreds of 
license plates without requiring officers to enter the license plate information into the 
computer. Furthermore, it would eliminate the distraction to officers of having to 
manually enter license plates while driving, and many license plates could be examined 
virtually simultaneously, rather than an officer making a decision about which plates to 
enter and missing other vehicles while entering the selected one. However, in being so 
efficient, ALPR should also result in an enormous increase in the number of „hits‟ 
officers receive during a typical shift. Increasing the number of stolen or uninsured 
vehicles or the number of unlicensed or prohibited drivers that police identify will have a 
significant impact on police workloads and the ability to respond to other traffic related 
incidents. Given this, the success of ALPR as a general traffic tool may require the police 
to rethink deployment strategies, the number of traffic officers on the road per shift, and, 
perhaps most importantly, implement a method of prioritizing the response to „hits‟.   
 As mentioned above, this current study will examine the feasibility and utility of 
deploying ALPR in parking lots. The potential value of targeting parking lots in Surrey is 
that these locations may be used as a place to abandon stolen vehicles. Deploying ALPR 
in parking lots may also be a time efficient way to discover uninsured vehicles and/or 
unlicensed or prohibited drivers.  
  
 This major paper is organized into four chapters. Chapter One examines the 
research literature on automatic license plate recognition systems, with a particular focus 
on the British experience. Chapter Two outlines the methodology of this current study 
and Chapter Three discusses the results of this project. Finally, Chapter Four provides a 
range of recommendations about the utility of ALPR as a crime reduction and crime 
prevention tool in parking lots.       
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Chapter One:  Review of the Research Literature 
 
 The use of ALPR technology is new in North America. However, this technology 
has been used for several years in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, this 
technology is referred to as Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). As the 
technologies are fundamentally the same and have been used in the same manner in both 
the United Kingdom and Surrey, the terms ANPR and ALPR will be used 
interchangeably.
1
 While there is a very limited research literature on this technology 
currently published, this chapter will examine the history of Automated License Plate 
Recognition technology and the effects of this technology specifically on police 
resources. Further there is limited research on this specific technology, this chapter will 
also examine the use of static cameras by police in public places as a crime prevention 
strategy. 
The British Experience with ANPR 
 
Similar to ALPR, ANPR uses pattern recognition software to read a vehicle‟s 
registration mark (PA Consulting Group, 2003). ANPR has been used by police in the 
United Kingdom for over a decade, initially to enforce traffic offences (Pughe, 2006). 
More recently, however, ANPR has been expanded into a mainstream policing tool as 
part of a national intelligence gathering network that can track nearly all vehicles in 
Britain. This growing network is able to capture five million vehicle plates a day (Pughe, 
2006). According to Pughe, the developing network “has ten times the capacity and uses 
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 The term ALPR refers specifically to the Canadian context. 
  
around 3,000 cameras comprising roadside cameras on posts and gantries (not speed 
cameras as has been reported elsewhere), cameras in police vehicles, local authority 
CCTV cameras, and even cameras on petrol forecourts” (2006: 36).  
 In 2001, each police force in the United Kingdom was equipped with vans 
containing ANPR cameras and computers with the ability to store the ANPR information 
in real time (Pughe, 2006). ANPR was tested from 2002 to 2003 with nine police forces, 
and again from 2003 to 2004 with 23 police forces. The main conclusion from these 
baseline experiments was that ANPR substantially increased arrests (Pughe, 2006). 
Before reviewing the details of these studies, it is important to understand the basic 
design of the ANPR system in the United Kingdom.  
The hub of the system is located in Hendon, London and is called the National 
ANPR Data Center (NADC). The centre was installed alongside the Police National 
Computer (PNC) (Pughe, 2006). The effectiveness of the system derives from the fact 
that all number plate data and current lists of suspect vehicles are housed by the NADC 
(Pughe, 2006). When a number plate is read by a camera in a police vehicle, four pieces 
of data are generated: (1) a text file detailing the car registration number, time and date of 
the scan, and the GPS location of the camera site; (2) a JPEG image of the plate; (3) a 
video image of the plate; and (4) a video of the vehicle occupants (Pughe, 2006).   
The ANPR data warehouse has the capacity to store 35 million plates per day 
(Pughe, 2006). Logistically, the 43 police forces of England and Wales each have their 
own ANPR servers which connect all ANPR cameras to the NADC (Pughe, 2006). When 
a picture is taken of a number plate by an ANPR camera, officers in the vehicle which 
took the photo receive information on whether the vehicle is stolen, has been involved in 
a crime, or is under surveillance. This entire process takes approximately four seconds 
(Pughe, 2006). During the four seconds, the number plate is examined by the computer 
system to determine whether there is a match in the Police National Computer system or 
in any of the other intelligence databases that ANPR is connected to, such as Revenue 
  
and Customs or the DVLA and Motor Insurance databases (Pughe, 2006). Having ANPR 
networked to a range of other data systems allows officers to identify vehicles that are not 
registered, taxed, insured, or are without valid insurance. Perhaps most important, the 
research on ANPR concluded that the system correctly read number plates 95% of the 
time (Pughe, 2006).  
The expansion of ANPR in the United Kingdom was due, in part, to a decline in 
the system‟s IT costs and improvements to the technology in the past few years (PA 
Consulting Group, 2003). Initially, in the United Kingdom, a six month pilot project took 
place in which nine police forces were selected to be part of ANPR-enabled intercept 
teams (PA Consulting Group, 2003). Entitled Laser 1, during this pilot phase, ANPR-
enabled police officers spent more than three quarters of their time (79 per cent) in the 
field on intercept duties or traveling to and from intercept duties (PA Consulting Group, 
2003). On average, police officers spent a slight majority of their time (57 per cent) away 
from the police station (PA Consulting Group, 2001; PA Consulting Group, 2003). 
Furthermore, ANPR intercept teams were more visible than typical police officers while 
out in the field carrying out their duties, which may have the additional effect of 
contributing to an increase in the public‟s feelings of safety and satisfaction with the 
police and lower levels of fear of crime (PA Consulting Group, 2003).  
In evaluating the conclusion that ANPR technology increased officer productivity, 
it is important to remember that there were clear differences between the duties of ANPR 
enabled intercept teams and the duties of typical police officers (PA Consulting Group, 
2003). For example, ANPR teams did not have to spend nearly as much time as other 
officers waiting for „hits‟. Instead, due to ANPR, these officers were able to spend 
considerably more time investigating vehicle „hits‟ (PA Consulting Group, 2003). In fact, 
according to PA Consulting Group (2003), it could be expected that a typical constable 
using ANPR would make, on average, 100 arrests per year; ten times the national average 
for a constable.  
  
In addition to a significant increase in the number of arrests one could expect by 
using ANPR, the evaluation of Laser 1 concluded that, on average, a constable operating 
as part of an ANPR-enabled intercept team, could also expect annually to: recover 11 
stolen vehicles valuing 68,000 pounds in total; recover stolen goods on three occasions 
with a total value of approximately 23,000 pounds; seize drugs on seven occasions 
valuing approximately 3,300 pounds in total; seize two offensive weapons or firearms; 
and recover stolen property on five occasions (PA Consulting Group, 2003). It is also 
interesting to note that the six months in which the pilot project was undertaken had 
extremely poor weather and light conditions. Given this, the researchers concluded that 
the averages presented above would likely be even higher if the project was piloted for a 
full year (PA Consulting Group, 2003).   
 In addition to the increased proportion of time officers spent investigating and 
dealing with untoward vehicles, and the increase in the number of arrests that ANPR-
enabled officers made compared to other officers, there were a number of other benefits 
associated with the use of the technology. One of the important benefits of ANPR was 
that it could provide the Home Office with a more accurate description of the total 
number of vehicles on the road which were in violation of some traffic or insurance 
regulation, associated with some other criminal offence, or were owned or operated by an 
individual of interest to the police. During Laser 1, one out of every 200 cars 
photographed by ANPR technology was stopped by the intercept teams for some reason 
(PA Consulting Group, 2003). In other words, for each hour in the field, each ANPR-
enabled officer stopped one vehicle. Moreover, in slightly less than two thirds of the 
cases in which an officer stopped a vehicle (61 per cent), the officer took some action as a 
result of the stop (PA Consulting Group, 2003). This result is likely due, in part, because 
one of the important benefits of ANPR is that it allows police to stop vehicles on the 
basis of prior intelligence. 
  
 It is important to keep in mind that ANPR is likely most effective when used in 
conjunction with other police strategies and techniques. For example, ANPR should not 
be considered a replacement for police experience and observation when on patrol. 
Indeed, with experience, police officers develop a sense of which vehicles or drivers 
should be investigated. This important skill was found to enhance the effectiveness of 
ANPR as, during Laser 1, officer observation generated nearly one quarter (22 per cent) 
of all vehicle stops (PA Consulting Group, 2003). 
Perhaps the biggest challenge posed by ANPR during the pilot phase was with 
respect to the question of adequate resourcing. With a standard complement of officers on 
patrol during a typical shift, the police were only able to adequately respond to 
approximately 13% of all „hits‟ during Laser 1 (PA Consulting Group, 2003). Given this, 
it would appear that current staffing levels for ANPR-enabled intercept teams would have 
to be increased considerably in order to capitalize on the full benefits of ANPR 
technology. 
 Based on the initial evaluation of Laser 1, it was concluded that ANPR 
significantly increased arrests rates when compared to conventional policing strategies. 
Still, no additional funding was available to further test the ability of ANPR-enabled 
intercept teams. However, conditional approval was given by the Home Office for a cost 
recovery program for ANPR-enabled intercept teams. This enabled police to use ANPR 
to target vehicle documentation offences and crime in general. This next phase in the use 
of ANPR was entitled Laser 2 and took place from June, 2003 to June, 2004 involving 23 
police forces from England and Wales operating dedicated intercept officers (PA 
Consulting Group, 2004).   
The total number of vehicles stopped in the twelve months during Laser 2 was 
180,543 which resulted in 13,499 people being arrested (PA Consulting Group, 2004). 
Figure 1 demonstrates the nature of the arrests made during Laser 1. As one of the main 
purposes of the ANPR technology was to assist the police in finding disqualified, 
  
uninsured, or prohibited drivers, it is important to note that one quarter of all arrests 
during Laser 2 were for these types of driving offences. Moreover, it is clear that ANPR-
enabled intercept teams also discovered other forms of criminality by stopping cars 
flagged by the system. For example, of all people arrested as a result of an ANPR 
induced stop, slightly less than one fifth (16.8 per cent) were for theft or burglary, while 
an additional one fifth were for either drug offences (8.2 per cent) or theft from a vehicle 
or theft of a vehicle (10.3 per cent) (see Figure 1).   
Figure 1: Types of Arrests 
 Chart adapted from PA Consulting Group (2004) 
 
The value of ANPR should not be measured exclusively in terms of the number of arrests 
made as a result of ANPR-induced stops. Many stops resulted in the police taking other 
actions in addition to making arrests, such as recovering or seizing property. For 
example, during Laser 2, the police recovered 1,152 stolen vehicles with a total value of 
7.5 million pounds. In other words, 0.6% of all ANPR „hits‟ resulted in the discovery and 
recovery of stolen vehicles. In addition to stolen vehicles, police seized 266 offensive 
weapons and firearms, drugs with a value of over 380,000 pounds from 740 vehicles, and 
640,000 pounds worth of stolen goods from 430 vehicles. 
  
 ANPR-enabled intercept teams also issued a large number of fixed penalties. 
Specifically, 12.6% of stops resulted in the police issuing a ticket for failing to display a 
valid Vehicle Excise Duty (VED). In 3.5% of cases, police issued a ticket for no 
insurance and, in 11.2% of cases, officers issued tickets for a variety of other offences, 
such as not wearing a seat belt or using a cellular phone while driving (PA Consulting 
Group, 2004). The evaluation of Laser 2 concluded that a typical ANPR-enabled 
intercept team officer would “contribute around 31 offences per annum towards the 
Government‟s Offences Brought to Justice Target” (PA Consulting Group, 2004: 6). This 
is over three times the expected rate for a non-ANPR-enabled officer. 
One of the more important results of Laser 2 was that it demonstrated that the 
benefits of ANPR could be sustained over a long period of time and over a larger cross 
section of forces in different jurisdictions (PA Consulting Group, 2004). More 
specifically, the analysis of the data suggested that the use of ANPR enabled intercept 
teams represented an innovative approach focusing on “targeting vehicle documentation 
enforcement to engage with and disrupt criminals delivered through an intelligence-led 
piece of technology (an ANPR reader)” (PA Consulting Group, 2004: 7). 
 Another significant recommendation derived from Laser 2 was that intelligence 
needs to be more effectively shared locally and nationally (PA Consulting Group, 2004). 
In effect, all vehicle intelligence needed to be housed in a national data warehouse so that 
it could be accessed, in real time, by national ANPR users. The data warehouse would 
also house ANPR reads and „hits‟ as a further source of vehicle intelligence which would 
benefit other criminal investigations, such as those involving major crimes, organized 
crime, or terrorism (PA Consulting Group, 2004). 
 To increase the productivity of ANPR-enabled teams, it was also recommended 
that, where appropriate, teams be relocated with the help of basic command and road 
policing units to make the best use of police time and resources (PA Consulting Group, 
2004). One of the concerns during both the Laser 1 and Laser 2 were that ANPR teams 
  
needed to travel to their target locations, thus reducing the amount of time per shift that 
the teams were operating in their designated locations. Moreover, to ensure that 
performance is properly monitored and that best practices and intelligence are 
appropriately shared strategically and operationally, support systems must be in place 
(PA Consulting Group, 2004). 
Overall, the results from Laser 1 and Laser 2 indicated that ANPR was beneficial 
to the police as it allowed officers to respond to more crimes through intelligence-led 
policing compared to conventional methods of policing. However, as mentioned above, 
an important question related to the implementation of this technology is how to respond 
to the increased workload generated by ANPR. The authors of the United Kingdom study 
indicated that there was not an ideal number of officers for an intercept team. However, it 
was recommended that teams be expanded. In considering the implementation of this 
technology in Canada, adequately resourcing intercept teams and planning for the 
increased workload would be required. This is, however, a particular concern in Canada 
given the current nation-wide shortage of police officers (Malm et al., 2004). Although, 
the use of ANPR would likely be beneficial for police in Canada in much the same way 
as it continues to be effective in the United Kingdom, the success of this program is, in 
part, dependent on ensuring the proper level of staffing resources.   
The Potential Benefits of ALPR in the Canadian Context 
 Due to an increase in workloads, the potential for expanding the number of 
officers on the roads, and/or an increase in the number of stops that police make on a 
typical shift, one of the potential benefits associated with the implementation of ALPR in 
Canada is that the police will become more present and more visibly active in the 
community. In addition to the deterrent effect that an actual or perceived increase in 
police presence might have on crime, the public may feel safer if they see and believe 
that their police are solving more crime. Related to this is the fact that ALPR allows the 
  
police to be more proactive as opposed to reactive. As demonstrated in the United 
Kingdom pilot projects, the ALPR technology assists officers in finding those, for 
example, with criminal records, outstanding warrants, driving prohibitions, and stolen 
vehicles. Importantly, ALPR can assist the police in finding these people before they 
commit additional offences. To better achieve this objective, in the United Kingdom, 
ANPR is linked to CCTVs, which will be discussed below.
2
 
 Another significant benefit found with the ANPR projects in the United Kingdom 
was that the volume of „hits‟ was such that there was not a lot of time spent by the police 
waiting for a „hit‟. In other words, ANPR contributed to a more efficient use of police 
patrol and shift time, thus maximizing resources. Still, a constant flow of „hits‟ is likely 
dependent on where the technology is deployed and the data systems that the technology 
is connected to. Nonetheless, the rate of „hits‟ experienced in the United Kingdom 
projects suggests that the technology will assist the police in identifying criminals at a 
much higher rate than other currently employed strategies. 
 As alluded to above, the operational success of the technology is dependent, in 
large part, on the link between the cameras in the police vehicles and the databases that 
are searched after a license plate is photographed. To maximize this benefit, a national 
data warehouse, similar to the one mentioned in the United Kingdom study, should be 
developed to house all the relevant data. The more information that is stored in this 
warehouse, with contributions from a wide range of databases, the more effective the 
police will be at identifying criminals. While the arguments for and against the 
development of a national data warehouse are beyond the scope of this paper, it is 
recognized that existing privacy legislation, security issues, and the lack of established 
information sharing protocols between government and the private sector could impede 
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 CCTV refers to Closed Circuit Television. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the use of CCTVs 
is especially beneficial in proactive policing when there is good communication between CCTV operators 
and the police.   
  
the formation of a national data warehouse. Notwithstanding this significant obstacle, the 
development of a national data warehouse is necessary when seriously considering the 
implementation of ALPR in multiple jurisdictions across Canada. Based on the United 
Kingdom experience, and the Canadian experience with respect to other policing issues, 
local and national information sharing is paramount for the successful implementation of 
ALPR in Canada.   
 Before discussing the effects of ALPR on police resources, it is useful to examine 
the United Kingdom‟s police experience with a similar technology, namely closed circuit 
television. 
CCTV and Policing 
 
The deployment of video surveillance cameras has become an innovation in 
a broad range of policing activities: the usage of surveillance images as 
evidence in court; documentation of interrogation procedures; covert 
surveillance in criminal investigations; monitoring of traffic flows for both 
management and control purposes; temporary and mobile surveillance of 
crowds at demonstrations and mass events to deter and detect public order 
offences; and last but not least the permanent operation of open street CCTV 
for combating street crime. CCTV is seen as a useful instrument for 
investigative assistance, evidence gathering, ensuring police procedures, 
efficient deployment of the scarce resource police, and finally proactive 
crime prevention (Hempel and Topfer, 2004: 51).   
The potential of CCTV has been recognized by the British Police who use it in response 
to the public‟s demand for more officers on the street and to assist the police in their core 
functions of crime control and fighting crime. According to Jay: 
Nevertheless, whilst public space CCTV systems continue to offer the police 
opportunities to improve their crime-fighting effectiveness, to increase their 
efficiency by means of the appropriate deployment of personnel in response 
to incidents caught „live‟ on camera, to provide the public with a substitute 
of sorts for officers on the beat, and to save the police time and effort by 
inducing admissions of guilt on the part of those caught on camera, the 
enthusiasm of the police service for CCTV is unlikely to diminish (1998: 
321). 
  
Police around the world are also using CCTV as part of a larger crime prevention 
strategy. In the United States, a large majority of law enforcement agencies 
(approximately 80 per cent) utilize CCTV (Nichols, 2001; Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 
2004). Many police forces in the United States have equipped mobile units with CCTV in 
order to effectively monitor arrest and detention procedures. CCTVs in the United States 
are also used to monitor courtrooms and government buildings. Furthermore, CCTV has 
also been used by American police agencies to monitor high crime areas, public streets, 
parks, and public housing schemes (Nichols, 2001; Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004).  
In China, surveillance infrastructure has been implemented on a large scale 
(Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004). Surveillance in China was implemented as part of the 
Golden Shield Project and the purpose of it was to advocate: 
 
…the adoption of advanced information and communication technology to 
strengthen central police control, responsiveness, and crime combating 
capacity, so as to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of police work.  
China‟s security apparatus announced an ambitious new plan; to build a 
nationwide digital surveillance network linking national, regional, and local 
security agencies with a panoptic web of surveillance. Beijing envisions the 
Golden Shield as a database-driven remote surveillance system offering 
immediate access to records on every citizen in China, while linking to vast 
networks of cameras designed to increase police efficiency (Walton, 2001: 
8).  
The Middle East is also employing CCTV to protect commercial establishments and 
guard against the threat of terrorism (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004). Police in Tehran, 
for example, have CCTV in each local police station that receives images from cameras 
throughout their jurisdiction (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004). The network in Tehran 
is so extensive that there is a central control room, similar to the national data warehouse 
in the United Kingdom, which receives information from the entire network and traffic 
control systems (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004). In Russia, countries throughout 
Eastern Europe, India, and Pakistan, CCTV is also used to prevent crime and to monitor 
the behavior of police officers (Norris, McCahill, & Wood, 2004). More specifically, in 
  
India and Pakistan, CCTV is expanding into the transportation sector to prevent theft and 
terrorism (Norris, McCahill, & Norris, 2004).    
 As CCTV becomes a more routine part of policing, researchers have examined 
police attitudes towards the technology. In general, the majority of officers viewed CCTV 
as an asset, assisting them to be more efficient and effective (Levesley and Martin, 2005).  
According to Levesley and Martin (2005), police officers felt that CCTV was a useful 
tool in dealing with a range of criminal behaviour, such as public order offences, theft, 
and assault, as the technology could help identify offenders and witnesses, support or 
challenge alibis, resolve contradictory accounts of similar events, and provide evidence in 
court. In addition to monitoring events and suspicious behavior in real time, CCTV has 
also been used to more effectively deploy officers, allow the police to respond to a 
situation before events escalate into more serious incidents, and provide guidance for 
officers on the scene (Levesley and Martin, 2005). 
Levesley and Martin contended that, in addition to the positive role of CCTV 
during court proceedings, such as saving time and money by inducing offenders to plead 
guilty, the police have used CCTV to make investigations more cost effective. However, 
as with ANPR, the use of CCTV has also been associated with increased police 
workloads. This is mainly because CCTV draws incidents to the attention of the police 
that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. In addition, CCTV requires that police spend 
time searching through and retrieving video footage; all of which increase the demands 
on police resources.   
 There are several lessons that can be learned from the research on CCTV that 
could be applied to ALPR deployment in Canada. As mentioned in the ANPR research, 
the effectiveness of CCTV tends to be linked to good communication between police 
officers and CCTV operators (Levesley and Martin, 2005). A recurring theme in 
Levesley and Martin‟s (2005) research was the necessity to recruit well-trained CCTV 
operators or a commitment to spend the extra money necessary to develop highly skilled 
  
CCTV operators. An alternative to well-trained CCTV operators might be to have a 
police presence in the control room to ensure effective deployment (Levesley and Martin, 
2005). Good communication and a police presence in the control room ensured that 
operators were also more likely to be sensitive to the demands made on police time and 
resources which allowed the operators to filter demands for service accordingly. This 
recommendation is extremely important because the training of CCTV operators in the 
United Kingdom was, in most cases, determined to be inadequate (Hempel and Topfer, 
2004). While the method of deploying ALPR is different than the use of CCTV, the 
lesson remains fundamentally the same. For ALPR to be most effective, officers who use 
the technology in their vehicles must be trained sufficiently as must those who are 
responsible for maintaining and updating the computer systems that ALPR depends on 
for its information.     
 In terms of using CCTV as an effective deployment tool, police reported a very 
high level of satisfaction (Levesley and Martin, 2005). In many cases, CCTV allowed the 
police to deploy officers before a complaint was received by the public. CCTV also 
allowed the police to monitor situations in real time ensuring, therefore, that the 
appropriate number of officers was deployed to an incident (Levesley and Martin, 2005).  
Again, these lessons are important in terms of the tactical deployment of ALPR. 
Specifically, over time, ALPR should assist the police in better defining „hot spots‟ or 
those locations or areas that are most likely to result in the highest number of quality 
„hits‟. Maximizing the quantity and quality of stops will inevitably result in the police 
being more efficient and effective. Moreover, by making stops based on intelligence, the 
police will be better prepared for what they might face during the stop, thus allowing 
them to send an appropriate number of officers to support the stop and being more 
tactical in their decisions about which cars to stop. 
 There are some problems with CCTV which might also be a concern with ALPR. 
For example, in order to store all of the video obtained by CCTV, data images are 
  
compressed. However, compression reduces the quality of images making it difficult for 
officers to use the photos in investigations or as evidence in judicial proceedings (Hempel 
and Topfer, 2004). This similar problem might be associated with ALPR. It is important 
to ensure that the quality of photos obtained by the cameras in the cars and the process of 
saving the images in a database are such that the images are useful for a myriad of police 
and judicial purposes. 
Based on the increased number of „hits‟ generated by the ANPR pilot projects and 
the research on CCTV which found that CCTV increased the potential for deploying 
officers to low or no priority incidents (Levesley and Martin, 2005), it is important for 
police managers to develop a system to prioritize what type of „hits‟ officers should 
respond to when deploying ALPR. This is extremely important because the highest single 
negative response about the use of CCTV was related to officer frustration with the 
increase in incidents being brought to their attention (Levesley and Martin, 2005). 
Similarly, as mentioned above, the research on Laser 1 concluded that the police were 
only able to respond to 13% of all „hits‟. This significant increase in the number of „hits‟ 
requires that the ALPR-enabled officers have a clear understanding of how they are to 
respond to the increased number of „hits‟ they receive on a typical shift. 
 In the United Kingdom, there is a large amount of vehicle documentation crime 
(PA Consulting Group, 2003). These crimes include not having a valid vehicle excise 
duty, no registered keeper information, not having a valid Ministry of Transport (MOT) 
test certificate, and driving while uninsured (PA Consulting Group, 2003). In the past, 
British police did not spend a significant proportion of their resources dealing with these 
crimes because they were not viewed as high priority (PA Consulting Group, 2003). 
However, with the publication of research demonstrating a link between vehicle crime 
and more general types of crime, the attitude of the police has shifted (PA Consulting 
Group, 2003). A Home Office study entitled Illegal Parking in Disabled Bays: A Means 
of Offender Targeting concluded that, of those people parking illegally in disabled 
  
parking bays, nearly one quarter (21 per cent) were of immediate police interest, one third 
(33 per cent) had a previous criminal record, nearly one half (49 per cent) of vehicles had 
a history of traffic violations, slightly less than one fifth (18 per cent) of vehicles were 
known or suspected of being used in other criminal activities, and approximately one in 
ten vehicles (11 per cent) were in breach of some other traffic law, such as not having a 
valid Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) (Chenery, Henshaw, & Pease, 1999; PA Consulting 
Group, 2003). In all cases, these findings were higher than for the average United 
Kingdom vehicle or driver (PA Consulting Group, 2003).  
Another study by the Home Office examined whether those engaged in anti- 
social behavior on the roads were likely to engage in other types of criminal activity 
(Rose, 2000; PA consulting Group, 2003). This study focused on driving while under the 
influence of alcohol, driving while disqualified, and dangerous driving (Rose, 2000; PA 
Consulting Group, 2003). The findings suggested that disqualified drivers shared a 
similar profile with mainstream criminal offenders (Rose, 2000; PA Consulting Group, 
2003). Specifically, more than three quarters of disqualified drivers (79 per cent) had a 
criminal record prior to disqualification. Nearly the same proportion (72 per cent) of 
mainstream offenders were disqualified drivers. Moreover, both disqualified drivers and 
mainstream offenders were equally likely to be convicted again within a one year time 
frame (37 per cent) (PA Consulting Group, 2003). 
 Another reason why vehicle documentation crime had not been a priority for 
British police was that their traffic sections faced significant resource constraints due to 
other policing priorities (PA Consulting Group, 2003). In support of this conclusion, the 
PA Consulting Group (2003) stated that, in spite of the fact that over a four year time 
frame (1997-2001) traffic volumes and incidents increased on British Highways, the 
number of traffic police officers declined by 12%. Clearly, a reduction of officers or an 
insufficient number of officers would have a direct effect on the number of incidents that 
traffic police can respond to, their response times, and the quality of service they can 
  
provide. With respect to ALPR, one implication of having too few officers is that the 
traffic divisions within detachments are likely to be stretched to their maximum 
capabilities trying to keep up with the increased number of incidents brought to the 
attention of the police as a result of the technology. As the British experience 
demonstrated, ANPR is extremely useful in assisting police to identify „hits‟, however, 
the combination of inadequately resourced traffic divisions and the increased number of 
„hits‟ requires the development of  a priority scheme to respond to „hits‟.         
 As mentioned above, police in Canada are also facing a shortage of general duty 
officers and, more specifically, traffic officers. In part, this shortage is the result of the 
aging police demographic which has produced a retirement bubble (Van Nieuwenhuizen 
Interview, 2006). To replace the large number of officers retiring, the police must 
aggressively recruit new members. However, at the beginning of 2000, the RCMP put a 
financial freeze on recruiting new members (Van Nieuwenhuizen Interview, 2006). The 
result of this policy is that it has been difficult for the RCMP to recruit a sufficient 
number of police officers to fill current staffing need. While not all police jurisdictions in 
Canada currently have a shortfall in members, making full use of the benefits derived 
from ALPR will likely require a significant increase in the number of officers, especially 
in the traffic divisions. It is, however, important to keep in mind that even with a 
commitment to increase the number of officers, there will likely still be important 
workload issues to consider as a result of the implementation of ALPR.    
 Although the research into ANPR and CCTV suggests that both technologies 
contribute significantly to the effectiveness and efficiency of police work, they also 
contribute to police workload. As police resources in Canada are scarce, it is likely that 
police may simply be unable to deal with the sheer volume of crimes and criminals that 
ALPR will help them identify. In addition to developing a priority scheme to deal with 
„hits‟, it may also be feasible to outfit community policing volunteer vehicles, such as 
Citizens on Patrol, with ALPR technology. For example, volunteers could be tasked with 
  
using ALPR to search for stolen or abandoned vehicles. Once volunteers get a „hit‟, they 
could contact the police with the location of the stolen car so that the police could 
determine how best to respond. Still, this potentially time saving measure would have to 
be balanced against the cost of purchasing and installing the technology, training 
volunteers on the technology, and all other ALPR-related expenses. 
 As outlined above, if ALPR were to be implemented in Canada, there are a 
number of important issues that must be considered and addressed, namely staffing, 
intelligence, deployment, and cost. In terms of staffing, it may be necessary to hire 
additional civilian staff to help police cope with the number of „hits‟ that ALPR will 
likely generate. In the United Kingdom pilot projects, civilian staff were part of ANPR-
enabled intercept units which assisted in reducing the workload on officers. In Canada, 
well trained civilians could be involved in the control room/dispatch helping to deploy 
police officers, could use ALPR-enabled vehicles to assist in looking for stolen or 
abandoned vehicles, could be used to search for „hits‟ in more static locations, such as 
parking lots, and could undertake a range of secretarial functions associated with the use 
of ALPR.   
 In addition to staffing, developing, implementing, and maintaining intelligence 
networks is critical for the success of the ALPR program. As mentioned throughout this 
paper, a national data warehouse, similar to the United Kingdom‟s, is necessary if ALPR 
is to be most effective. Moreover, the greater the number of different databases that the 
police have access to, the more effective they will be at preventing, deterring, and 
responding to crime and criminals. The creation of this type of intelligence network will 
undoubtedly be time consuming and expensive as a wide range of government agencies 
and stakeholders would have to be involved in its development and operation. 
Nonetheless, the benefits of this undertaking will be the more efficient operation of 
ALPR in the long and short-term.  
  
 Deployment is another important issue that needs to be considered. One crucial 
question is whether it is better to deploy ALPR-enabled intercept teams from one central 
location or have several support sites capable of deploying teams. It is also important to 
consider whether there are „hot spots‟ or corridors within a jurisdiction where it might be 
better to concentrate ALPR resources, or whether police should simply drive their usual 
patrol routes. 
For obvious reasons, cost is also an extremely important consideration prior to the 
full implementation of ALPR. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve fully 
into the issue of cost, it is necessary to consider the cost of the technology, in terms of 
purchase, installation, maintenance, data warehousing, staffing, and training. It is also 
necessary to consider these costs against the costs associated with a reduction in crime, 
the recovery of vehicles and goods, and public perception. In some ways, the lessons 
learned in the United Kingdom‟s pilot projects can be instructive. British Columbia 
appears to be taking a measured approach to ALPR as it is piloting the technology in a 
variety of jurisdictions for at least one year prior to making a final decision about its full 
deployment. 
 One further issue that should be mentioned is the challenge that ALPR technology 
poses to privacy or civil liberties. This issue is not dealt with in a rigorous manner in the 
ANPR literature, however, privacy and civil liberty concerns have been discussed in the 
context of CCTV. In Canada, concerns have been raised about the use of CCTVs in 
public spaces. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada has legally challenged the use of 
CCTVs stating that “continuous, non-selective monitoring is a violation of the Privacy 
Act and that the sophistication of the technology makes them particular privacy-invasive 
requiring a higher standard of justification than other forms of intelligence gathering” 
(Deisman, 2003: 18). Furthermore, in terms of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, “it is claimed that indiscriminate video surveillance in the absence of cause, 
even without continuous recording, breaches the fundamental privacy rights of all 
  
Canadians” (Deisman, 2003: 18) as set out in the Charter, the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. According to Pughe (2006), the capacity of the state to engage in universal 
surveillance tests the limits of the principle of innocent until proven guilty. Moreover, 
part of the trust that society places with the police is based on the belief that police target 
those individuals where there exists some evidence of criminal activity, rather than 
tracking and passively investigating everybody while they are engaged in their normal 
business. Furthermore, Deisman described the Privacy Commissioner‟s stance as: 
 
…Canadians retain the right of being lost in the crowd, of going about their 
business without being systematically monitored by anyone, let alone the 
police. Further that there is a reasonable expectation of, and entitlement to, a 
degree of privacy, even in a public place. And, finally, that the use of video 
surveillance by the RCMP infringes on the exercise of freedom of 
association, prevents the exercise of mobility rights, deprives Canadians of 
their liberty and security of person, and constitutes unreasonable search and 
seizure (2003:18).  
It should be noted that the basis of the Privacy Commissioner‟s legal argument stemmed 
from the fact that research has not confirmed the benefits of CCTV (Deisman, 2003). The 
Privacy Commissioner asserted that CCTV does not actually reduce crime, but merely 
displaces it to other areas, nor does it reduce violent crime (Deisman, 2003). In 
conclusion, the general view of the Commissioner was that CCTV would have a negative 
effect on policing by reducing the number of police officers on the street and placing an 
additional strain on limited police resources (Deisman, 2003).          
 However, from the perspective of the police and the government, technologies, 
such as ALPR, provide the police with the ability to take advantage of the enormous 
power of modern computing, storage, and networking to more effectively and proactively 
carry out their primary responsibilities of preventing crime and protecting society. Given 
this, it is necessary to consider all of the potential benefits of ALPR against the 
possibility that this technology could undermine civil liberties (Pughe, 2006).  
  
Due to the fact that the use of CCTVs in Canada currently constitutes an 
infringement of privacy and civil liberties, the use of ALPR might be similarly classified. 
However, according to Deisman, even “if it is determined that the use of CCTV systems 
by the State in public spaces is not, as a matter of principle, unconstitutional or illegal 
objectionable, there is still a formidable set of issues associated with the governance and 
regulation of CCTV systems so that their use does not run afoul of the law or the 
Charter” (2003: 19). It would appear, therefore, that research is required to better 
understand how the use of ALPR can be effectively deployed in a way that does not 
compromise the benefits of the technology, but is also used in accordance with privacy 
and civil liberties legislation.           
 In order to assess the feasibility of ALPR in Canada, a pilot project using the 
technology was conducted in Surrey, British Columbia, Canada in 2006. As part of this 
larger pilot project, one unmarked police vehicle equipped with ALPR technology was 
deployed to a number of major parking lots in Surrey. The purpose of this current study is 
to examine the data from this one car to analyse the quantity, quality, and location of 
„hits‟ to determine whether it was a viable and useful strategy to deploy ALPR-enabled 
police vehicles to parking lots.     
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Chapter Two: Project Methodology 
 The ALPR technology used in the Surrey pilot project was based on the same 
technology used in the United Kingdom. The ALPR camera system and computer system 
are separate entities. Every morning, before the car was deployed, „hot lists‟ of vehicles 
were obtained from the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) and the Motor 
Vehicle Branch. The „hot list‟ from the Motor Vehicle branch consisted of three pieces of 
data: (1) Unlicensed drivers; (2) uninsured/unlicensed vehicles; and (3) prohibited 
drivers. The „hot list‟ from CPIC contained information exclusively on stolen vehicles. 
These lists were loaded into the police vehicle‟s onboard computer. In effect, the „hot 
lists‟ were uploaded into the car‟s computer system every twenty four hours. In other 
words, the ALPR technology was not “live”. The „hot lists‟ which were downloaded to 
the onboard computer were not updated throughout the day. The implications of this 
process will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
 The vehicle‟s ALPR camera was equipped with infrared illuminators that helped 
the camera locate a vehicle‟s license plate. The infrared illuminators were attracted to 
license plates because the plates are reflective. In every instance, the camera took a 
picture of the entire vehicle, but isolated the license plate. The system was programmed 
with the specifications of British Columbia license plates and searched the vehicle for its 
location. Once the license plate was located, the computer compared the characters of the 
license plate against the downloaded „hot lists‟ in the onboard computer. If the computer 
found a match, an alarm in the police vehicle sounded. The computer screen in the police 
vehicle showed the photo of the entire target car, a photo of the license plate, and the 
license plate that was read by the computer. This last piece of information was critical as 
it allowed the officer to determine whether the computer accurately read the license plate. 
In addition to this information, the monitor informed the officer as to the nature of the 
  
„hit‟. All of this information was presented to the officer within seconds of the camera 
taking the original photograph. 
 In order for the ALPR-enabled police car to be effective for parking lot 
deployment, the cameras were set at a ninety degree angle. The police car, using only one 
camera, would drive down each row of parked cars and read each license plate. The car 
would then turn around and go down the same row photographing all of the cars on the 
other side. In order to allow the police vehicle to go down each row only once and 
photograph all of the cars on both sides, a second camera would have to be installed in 
the car and the ALPR system would have to be reconfigured somewhat. As mentioned in 
the previous section, the costs of the doing this would have to be weighed against the 
time saved by only driving down each parking lot row once as opposed to twice. 
 It is important to keep in mind that this test of the ALPR technology was limited 
to the aforementioned four categories of „hits‟. The category of stolen vehicles was 
selected in order to determine whether ALPR technology would be a more effective way 
of locating stolen vehicles compared to some of the other local programs already in place, 
such as those by Citizens on Patrol. The other „hit list‟ categories were selected because 
there were no other police programs in place for finding wanted persons in British 
Columbia. Still, there were many other categories of offenses that were not included in 
the „hot lists‟ primarily because CPIC Ottawa wanted the Integrated Municipal Provincial 
Auto Crime Team (IMPACT), the team responsible for the pilot project, to make a case 
for the viability of the technology before releasing additional „hot lists‟.3           
  All of the patrolled parking lots were selected in consultation with the Surrey 
RCMP. A sample of parking lots in high and low crime areas were selected in order to 
determine whether there were specific parking lots in Surrey that were more appropriate 
                                                 
3
 An evaluation of ALPR using four unmarked cars patrolling specific traffic corridors in Surrey was 
undertaken around the same time as the parking lot study. However, the results of this evaluation have not 
yet been published and, therefore, are not included in this major paper. 
  
for ALPR. In total, 31 parking lots were selected for inclusion in the pilot study. In 
addition to the consultations with the Surrey RCMP, the list of parking lots was also 
mapped in conjunction with the Surrey Crime Prevention Society. The Surrey Crime 
Prevention Society has a mobile patrol team that assists the RCMP specifically with auto 
crime. Once all of the parking lots were selected, the author of this report rode along with 
the mobile patrol team for five days to develop a route to all the parking lots which would 
be most efficient. As a result of these ride-alongs, a circuit was developed which mapped 
out the shortest routes between parking lots in order to minimize the amount of time the 
ALPR-enabled police car was in a designated parking lot (for a complete list of the 
parking lots, please see Appendix A).  
Another purpose of the ride-along was to determine how long it would take the 
ALPR-enabled car to photograph every car in the entire parking lot. It was not feasible, 
during the mapping phase of the project, to drive up and down every row of each parking 
lot in all 31 parking lots. With the help of Surrey Crime Prevention Society, for some 
parking lots, the research team estimated as accurately as possible how long it would take 
the ALPR-enabled car to drive through the entire parking lot. In terms of this estimate, 
consideration was given to the typical number of vehicles that would be parked in the lot 
on any given day.  
Once this was completed, a complete route was created that would occupy the 
ALPR-enabled vehicle for a ten hour shift for seven consecutive days. Based on 
resourcing issues, time constraints, and a consideration of the parking patterns of vehicles 
in these parking lots, it was decided that the ALPR-enabled vehicle would operate from 
1400 hours to 2400 hours for seven consecutive days. In order to ensure that the ALPR-
enabled vehicle was in each lot at different times of the day, the car would start the circuit 
at a different point along the route each day and would complete the entire circuit as 
many times as possible during each ten hour shift. Finally, parking lots in four districts of 
  
Surrey were included in the circuit.
4
 In all four districts, major parking lots were selected, 
such as the parking lots of large shopping centers, strip malls along major traffic 
corridors, bars, motels and SkyTrain Stations.      
 The larger pilot project testing the ALPR technology consisted of two phases.  
The first phase was to understand how to best deploy the technology by collecting 
baseline data, while the second phase consisted of testing the technology live to 
determine what impact this technology had on police resources. This current study 
analyses exclusively the data from the parking lot ALPR-enabled vehicle during the first 
phase of this project. During this phase, volunteer students from the University-College 
of the Fraser Valley rode along in the ALPR-enabled vehicle and recorded specific 
information on each „hit‟. This method was necessary as the RCMP had not yet 
developed an efficient way to get the data out of their central data warehouse at the end 
of each shift for analysis. Moreover, having a student compare the photo of the license 
plate against the characters read by the computer for each „hit‟ allowed the researchers to 
determine the technology‟s level of accuracy in reading plates.  
Whenever there was a „hit‟, the coder would record the date, time, and location of 
the „hit‟, the nature of the „hit‟, and whether or not the ALPR camera accurately recorded 
the license plate of the target vehicle (see Appendix B for the data collection form). At 
the end of each shift, all of the coding forms were entered into an SPSS database for 
analysis.   
                                                 
4
 The four districts of Surrey are: Whalley, Guildford, Newton, and South Surrey. 
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Chapter Three: Research Results 
 As discussed in the methodology chapter, the ALPR-enabled vehicle was 
deployed for seven consecutive days for ten hours from 2 pm to midnight during the first 
week of November, 2006. A total of 21,876 license plates in the 31 parking lots were 
read. A very small proportion of all photos taken resulted in a „hit‟ (1.6 per cent). Still, 
there is a hit for every sixty two photos taken and given the number of „hits‟ (n = 352) 
and the total number of minutes that the ALPR-enabled car was operational (5,060 
minutes), on average, the car had a „hit‟ every 4.3 minutes or 4 hits per hour. In terms of 
the ability of the ALPR camera to correctly read license plates, the computer was 
accurate in almost all cases (97.7 per cent). Moreover, in 10% of the „hit‟ vehicles, the 
registered owner of a vehicle had a criminal history.
5
 
As indicated in Figure 2, „hits‟ were, for the most part, evenly distributed 
throughout the week. It is interesting to note that, although one might anticipate that the 
volume of vehicles would be much higher on the weekend, this did not result in a 
substantial increase in the number of „hits‟ on the weekend. Moreover, the day with the 
highest proportion of hits was Thursday (18.2 per cent) followed by Saturday (16.5 per 
cent) and Sunday (15.9 per cent). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 No further analysis was done on the criminal histories of drivers because of the inability to collect 
consistent data from CPIC (Canadian Police Information Center). 
  
Figure 2: Distribution of ‘Hits’ by Day of the Week 
 
  In terms of the time of day in which „hits‟ occurred, nearly three quarters (72 per 
cent) of all „hits‟ occurred between 3 and 7 pm. (see Figure 3). However, unlike the day 
of the week, there was less of an even distribution with respect to time. The assumption 
that the greatest proportion of „hits‟ would occur late at night was not evident as only 
3.4% of „hits‟ occurred between 11 pm and midnight. In fact, the hours with the greatest 
proportion of „hits‟ were 4 pm (19.9 per cent), 3 pm (14.8 per cent), and 7 pm (14.8 per 
cent). Not surprisingly, 4 pm and 5 pm accounted for slightly more than one third (34.4 
per cent) of all „hits‟. It would appear that these results were a function of car volume in 
that there were more cars in major parking lots during the hours that shopping mall stores 
were open. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Distribution of ‘Hits’ by Time of Day 
 
   An analysis of the nature of „hits‟ revealed that slightly more than two thirds of all 
„hits‟ (69.8 per cent) were for unlicensed drivers. An additional one quarter (23.9 per 
cent) of all „hits‟ were for unlicensed vehicles, while a very small proportion (4.8 per 
cent) were for prohibited drivers. The ALPR-enabled car located very few stolen vehicles 
(1.4 per cent). In fact, there were only four „hits‟ for a stolen vehicle. There are several 
possible explanations for this finding, which will be discussed in the next chapter, 
however, it is important to note that this finding may suggest that ALPR, especially when 
deployed to parking lots, may not be the most efficient use of the technology.       
 Figure 4 presents the results of an analysis on the relationship between the nature 
of „hit‟ and the time of day that the „hit‟ occurred. Due to the low number of stolen 
vehicles, this type of „hit‟ was not included in the analysis. For the most part, uninsured 
or unlicensed vehicles were most likely to be found between 3 pm and 5 pm (55.9 per 
cent). It is possible that this occurred because drivers thought that they were less likely to 
be caught if they were on the roads during high traffic density times. Another explanation 
might be that this was simply the peak periods at shopping centers and drivers may have 
thought that they were less likely to be discovered in busy parking lots. The effectiveness 
  
of ALPR is that these kinds of drivers will be detected even if they back their vehicles 
into parking spots in an attempt to make it harder for police to see their insurance decals. 
Figure 4: Distribution of the Nature of ‘Hit’ by Time of Day 
 
   Prohibited drivers were somewhat unevenly distributed throughout the time 
period. On the other hand, there were several time periods (2 pm, 6 pm, 9 pm, and 
midnight) in which no prohibited drivers were detected. However, there appeared to be 
two time periods (3 pm and 7 pm) which accounted for the majority (52.9 per cent) of 
prohibited driver „hits‟. Unlicensed drivers were somewhat evenly distributed throughout 
the time periods. The two most frequent time periods were 4 pm (20.8 per cent) and 7 pm 
(15.9 per cent). Likely similar to uninsured or unlicensed vehicles, prohibited and 
unlicensed drivers might have selected to drive at these times because these are both peak 
traffic times and the parking lots were likely to be more full. Without ALPR technology, 
both of these factors could contribute to a driver feeling confident that their chances of 
being discovered were very low.        
 As mentioned in the methodology chapter, a total of 31 parking lots were selected 
to be part of the routing for the ALPR-enabled vehicle. However, five parking lots 
accounted for nearly half of all „hits‟ (47.7 per cent). These five parking lots were: 
  
Guildford Town Centre (12.8 per cent); Strawberry Hill Lot (12.4 per cent); Central City 
Lot (9.4 per cent); Surrey Central SkyTrain Station (6.7 per cent); and Scott Road 
SkyTrain Station (6.4 per cent). Table 1 presents an analysis of the nature of „hits‟ in 
these five locations.
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Table 1:  Parking Lots by the Nature of Hits 
Parking Lots Uninsured/Unlicensed 
Vehicles 
(n = 84) 
Prohibited 
Drivers 
(n = 17) 
Unlicensed 
Drivers 
(n = 245) 
Guildford Town Centre 16.4% 21.4% 11.3% 
Strawberry Hill Lot 16.4% 7.1% 11.7% 
Central City Lot 6.0% 7.1% 6.1% 
Surrey Central SkyTrain Station 9.0% 14.3% 9.4% 
Scott Road SkyTrain Station 6.0% 7.1% 6.6% 
 
It is interesting to note that although Guildford Town Centre accounted for 12.8% of all 
„hits‟, it contributed slightly more than one fifth (21.4 per cent) of all „hits‟ for prohibited 
drivers. It is also slightly overrepresented in its proportion of uninsured or unlicensed 
vehicles (16.4 per cent).  
Perhaps more importantly, approximately one third (32.8 per cent) of all „hits‟ for 
an uninsured or unlicensed vehicle occurred at Guildford Town Centre and Strawberry 
Hill parking lots. Again, this may be a result of owners believing that their chances of 
being discovered was less if they park in large, busy parking lots.  
Slightly more than one third of prohibited drivers (35.7 per cent) were discovered 
at Guildford Town Center (21.4%) and Surrey Central SkyTrain Station (14.3%) parking 
lots. It was initially believed that a high proportion of prohibited drivers would be 
discovered at SkyTrain station parking lots as drivers may consider it less risky to drive 
to the SkyTrain and take this form of transportation than drive all the way to their 
destination. While this might account for those „hits‟ at the Surrey Central SkyTrain 
                                                 
6
 Due to the way data was collected, it was not possible to determine a hit rate or proportion of hits by the 
number of photographs taken in each parking lot. 
  
Station, only 7.1% of all prohibited driver „hits‟ occurred at the Scott Road SkyTrain 
Station parking lot (see Table 1). Moreover, this does not account for the fact that slightly 
more than one fifth of all prohibited driver „hits‟ occurred at Guildford Town Centre 
parking lot. Still, Guildford Town Center is a large shopping mall with an enormous 
parking lot. In considering these findings, however, it is important to keep in mind that 
only 17 prohibited drivers in total were discovered. 
The large majority of „hits‟ (69.8 per cent) were associated with unlicensed 
drivers. A similar proportion of unlicensed drivers were discovered at Strawberry Hill 
(11.7 per cent), Guildford Town Center (11.3%), and Surrey Central SkyTrain Station 
(9.4 per cent) parking lots, accounting for approximately one third (32.4 per cent) of all 
„hits‟ for unlicensed drivers. Although only a small proportion of „hits‟ uncovered an 
individual with a criminal history (10 per cent), it is possible that the full pilot project 
will demonstrate similar results to the United Kingdom studies where there was an 
association between driving offences and criminality. If so, the fact that 1.1% of all 
photos taken of cars in parking lots results in a „hit‟ for an unlicensed driver may have a 
significant impact on policing and crime reduction. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The results presented in Chapter Three have a number of important implications 
for the use of ALPR in Canada. This chapter will discuss both the implications and 
recommendations associated with the use of ALPR-enabled cars in parking lots and more 
general recommendations for the deployment of ALPR as part of a crime reduction 
strategy for British Columbia. 
In terms of the data on ALPR in parking lots, the proportion of „hits‟ was low. 
However, it would appear that, regardless of the type of „hit‟ one was interested in, based 
on the „hot lists‟, the best time to deploy ALPR-enabled cars to parking lots is in the 
afternoons and evenings between 3 pm and 7 pm. Given this, it would likely be more 
efficient to deploy the ALPR-enabled parking lot vehicle along major traffic corridors 
during the remainder of the shift. 
 Given that of the approximately 22,000 photos taken only four vehicles were 
found to be stolen, ALPR does not appear to enhance the police‟s ability to locate stolen 
vehicles. There are, however, several potential reasons for the low number of stolen 
vehicles discovered by ALPR. First, the overall number of stolen vehicles in Surrey 
compared to the total number of cars in Surrey is extremely small. Furthermore, for these 
vehicles to be discovered by the technology, the cars have to be parked in one of the 31 
identified parking lots in Surrey. In addition, because the „hot list‟ data is uploaded into 
the ALPR-enabled vehicle only once in the morning and not updated during the shift, the 
stolen vehicle information is at least 24 hours old. Finally, in order for ALPR to locate a 
stolen vehicle there has to be a meeting in time and space between the ALPR-enabled 
police vehicle and the stolen car. As there was only one ALPR-enabled vehicle 
examining cars exclusively in parking lots, and the car was constantly moving from 
parking lot to parking lot, and the stolen vehicle had to be in the parking lot at the time 
  
the ALPR-enabled vehicle was also in the lot, it is extremely unlikely that this meeting 
would ever take place. Given that all of these factors contribute to making it extremely 
difficult to locate a stolen vehicle, even if we accept the theory that parking lots make 
good locations to abandon stolen vehicles, it is not surprising that there were so few 
stolen vehicles located. Instead, stationary cameras at the major entries and exits for 
parking lots, or along major traffic corridor intersections, may be a more feasible 
approach to discovering stolen or abandoned vehicles. 
  Given the proportion of „hits‟ in parking lots, it is recommended that ALPR not 
be deployed to parking lots alone. While there may be a benefit to deploying ALPR-
enabled vehicles to parking lots between 3 pm and 7 pm, especially if they are being 
operated by community policing volunteers, to reduce the strain on police resources, it 
would appear that the technology might be best deployed along high traffic corridors.     
In effect, the results of this limited pilot project indicated that ALPR was an 
useful mobile apprehension tool. If it is to be deployed as piloted, the best way to deploy 
ALPR technology may be to make it available to police officers who enforce traffic 
violations and to use it only in a select few parking lots. ALPR technology will 
undoubtedly increase the number of drivers the police identify with criminal records and 
who are not supposed to be driving. One of the major benefits of ALPR technology is 
that traffic members can find these drivers while they are out on patrol during the course 
of their regular duties. Even if police decide to drive through a parking lot to investigate 
the cars parked there, ALPR-enabled officers will save a considerable amount of time 
simply because they will not have to manually enter each license plate or only enter a 
sample of plates. In a manner of speaking, with the use of ALPR, the criminals come to 
the police.   
 Based solely on the success of this limited research in identifying prohibited and 
unlicensed drivers, it would appear that ALPR could be effectively expanded to discover 
all types of wanted persons. It would appear that ALPR, as it is currently deployed in 
  
British Columbia, would be even more effective if CPIC Ottawa released more „hot lists‟ 
which would allow the police a greater opportunity to catch even more criminals.  
However, the ability to catch more criminals will not just increase police workload, but 
will likely have far reaching effects throughout the criminal justice system. The increased 
number of criminals detected by police with ALPR will have to be processed through the 
criminal justice system which will effect the courts and corrections. The current back-log 
issues in the courts will increase with a sudden increase in volume. Similarly, an increase 
in the number of those convicted will increase the burden on the Correctional Service of 
Canada. However, considering the potential deterrent effect of ALPR, it is possible, that 
this increase will be a short-term problem. Over time, ALPR should not result in just an 
increase in criminals coming to the attention of the police, but a decrease in the overall 
number of „hits‟. In other words, rather than just a tool for enforcement, ALPR has the 
capacity to be a significant prevention tool. The prevention of prohibited or unlicensed 
drivers on the road may prove to be the main beneficial outcome of implementing this 
technology.        
 The use of ALPR technology will undoubtedly increase police workload. There is 
not, unfortunately, one best way to respond to the workload issue. One obvious way to 
address this concern is to increase police traffic sections. In most cases, police traffic 
sections are not fully staffed or resourced (Malm et al., 2005). Nonetheless, police 
agencies will have to determine whether enforcing traffic violations is a priority. 
However, for any police agency to make effective use of ALPR technology, it is 
necessary to have enough members to deal with the increased number of „hits‟ the 
technology generates. Similar to the United Kingdom experience with ANPR, it may be 
necessary to hire civilians to be part of ALPR teams. Based on the United Kingdom 
experience, ALPR will likely result in increased arrests, paperwork, and officer time 
spent in court. Given this, there is likely a value in considering some of the lessons 
  
learned from the United Kingdom pilot projects. In terms of the staffing issue, one of the 
key findings from the United Kingdom test of ANPR technology was:  
 
The average staffing per force for ANPR-enabled intercept teams was one 
Inspector/Sergeant, seven Constables, and half an administrative assistant. 
This equates to 290,000 pounds per force per annum. On average, staff spent 
about half their time on intercept duties, 25% of their time traveling to and 
from ANPR sites or rest periods, and the remainder of their time dealing 
with administration/prisoner handling (PA Consulting Group, 2003: 16).      
As mentioned in Chapter One, in the United Kingdom study, there were no specific 
recommendations in terms of the ideal number of officers for intercept teams. However, 
there was the clear suggestion that the teams be increased. In terms of ALPR 
implementation in Canada, police organizations may need to experiment with several 
staffing models to determine the most appropriate number of members per ALPR team. 
While policing priorities will play a role in determining whether or not, or the degree to 
which, ALPR will be deployed, based on this current study of ALPR, it seems clear that 
police traffic sections should be encouraged to use this technology. Based on the fact that 
ALPR technology has the ability to read 3,600 plates per hour, even in cases where the 
ALPR-enabled vehicle is traveling at speeds of up to 100 miles per hour
7
 (Pughe, 2006), 
this technology would be extremely useful for municipal traffic sections and highway 
patrol, in part, because criminals are mobile and do not restrict their criminality to a 
single police jurisdiction. As such, ALPR appears to be an excellent way to catch wanted 
criminals who cross jurisdictional boundaries, especially if law enforcement agencies 
communicate with each other and share information. 
 As discussed throughout this paper, based on the rapid rate at which „hits‟ are 
discovered, it would appear that it is necessary for each police agency to create a 
prioritization scheme for responding to „hits‟ when implementing ALPR. In designing a 
priority scheme, a number of different issues must be considered, such as specific police 
                                                 
7
 In practice, due to the speed at which the ALPR enabled car can drive in a parking lot, the number of 
photos per hour in this study is 259.4 per hour. 
  
priorities, how to operationally deal with ALPR „hits‟, how to maximize the response 
time to „hits‟, and which „hits‟ to respond to. Clearly, police priorities will determine 
which ALPR „hits‟ police will respond to and the order in which police will respond to 
these „hits‟. For example, if auto crime is a particular priority in a given jurisdiction, the 
use of ALPR would likely be less of a priority as the technology does not appear to be 
particularly well suited to discovering stolen and abandoned vehicles. However, an 
additional priority may be enforcing traffic violations. In this case, ALPR technology can 
be extremely beneficial, specifically in terms of assisting the police in finding uninsured 
or unlicensed vehicles, prohibited drivers, and unlicensed drivers.  
Another important benefit of developing a priority scheme in line with general 
police priorities is that it will assist police agencies in determining how to respond to the 
sheer number of „hits‟ generated through the use of ALPR. In other words, while in this 
pilot study, a large proportion of „hits‟ were for an unlicensed drivers, the ratio of „hit‟ 
types may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and is also likely different along major 
traffic corridors compared to parking lots. In high volume areas, where the nature of 
„hits‟ are more evenly distributed, police will have to decide whether they give priority to 
unlicensed drivers over prohibited drivers, for example, or whether „hits‟ for unlicensed 
vehicles will be responded to before unlicensed drivers. Therefore, it is recommended 
that the technology always be piloted in order to determine general baseline information 
about the quantity and quality of „hits‟ prior to full deployment. In addition to this 
information providing managers with a better idea of where ALPR is likely to be most 
effective, the baseline data would provide analysts with the information necessary to 
make informed decisions about the implementation of a priority scheme for responding to 
„hits‟.  
Police agencies may also find that volunteer groups, such as Citizens on Patrol, 
may be helpful in making ALPR more effective and reducing some of the workload 
issues associated with the technology. Volunteer groups could assist the police by 
  
filtering ALPR „hits‟ and could have access to the technology and communicate with 
police when they discover a particular type of „hit‟ based on the prioritization scheme.  
As with the introduction of any new piece of technology, police agencies 
seriously considering implementing ALPR technology should invest the necessary time 
and resources to properly pilot the technology. If the pilot phase concludes that there 
were benefits to implementing ALPR, the introduction of the technology to the field 
should occur slowly, in phases, to avoid overwhelming the organization. It is 
recommended that, at first, only a few vehicles be equipped with the technology and only 
a few officers undergo training to use the technology. After a period of time, the results 
of this initial phase should be thoroughly analyzed to determine the most effective and 
efficient manner to expand the use of ALPR. In terms of specific steps to take, both the 
United Kingdom‟s and Surrey‟s pilot and implementation strategies serve as excellent 
models. 
 For the most part, ALPR would appear to be an excellent tool for police agencies 
in terms of apprehending offenders. However, in order for ALPR to function most 
effectively, it is necessary for the onboard computer to have a live link to police 
databases. Rather than downloading „hot lists‟ into the onboard computer at the 
beginning of the shift in the morning and continuing to compare photographed cars to 
data that is, at least, 24 hours old, it would be better to have a live connection so that as 
computer systems are updated with new information, that information is available 
immediately to the officer in the ALPR-enabled vehicle. In addition, expanding the 
information sources or the number of „hot lists‟ available to ALPR-enabled officers 
would also result in a greater number of quality „hits‟.  
It is also important to keep in mind that ALPR does not eliminate the need for a 
well-trained, observant police officer. Not only does the technology require trained police 
officers or volunteers to operate the vehicle and decide how to respond to „hits‟, but, as 
the United Kingdom pilot projects concluded, the system works best in combination with 
  
an experienced officer using their powers of observation, discretion, and decision-
making.   
 Overall, based on the current study of ALPR deployment in parking lots, and the 
research being conducted on the technology in the larger Surrey pilot phases and the 
United Kingdom studies, ALPR is a viable technology that is an excellent additional 
resource for law enforcement agencies. It would be interesting to conduct a similar study 
with a larger sample of parking lots and ALPR-enabled vehicles 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week, in multiple jurisdictions.   
It appears that regardless of police priorities, ALPR increases the effectiveness 
and efficiency of traffic and patrol officers. However, this must be balanced against the 
costs of purchasing, installing, and maintaining the system, training officers and staff to 
operate the technology, increased workloads, creating an information sharing and storing 
system, and addressing privacy and civil liberty concerns.  
As mentioned above, ALPR technology could also serve as a deterrent for 
potential criminals. Even if the technology was phased in over time to prevent 
overwhelming an organization, it is important to create the public image that the 
technology is widespread, similar to the strategy employed with the bait car program. 
Municipalities and agencies, such as ICBC, may also be interested in the technology if it 
demonstrates that it can, for example, help law enforcement agencies enforce traffic 
violation offences, catch criminals, and reduce crime more effectively and efficiently 
than conventional policing methods. Still, ALPR must be considered within the larger 
context of police resourcing and strategic thinking. While this technology does appear to 
have a role to play in the prevention and apprehension of offenders, it should not be used 
as a replacement for other police strategies. Given the realities of limited police 
resourcing, the funds that would be allocated to ALPR would likely come at the expense 
of some other police program or strategy. As such, ALPR should be considered a useful 
  
tool for the police, but should be evaluated more fully to understand how it can best be 
used in combination with other police programs.  
As more law enforcement agencies implement ALPR technology, it will be 
interesting to conduct a series of research projects examining the measurable benefits 
derived from the technology against the costs and workload issues generated by ALPR. It 
is interesting that it appears that many of the technological obstacles associated with the 
technology have been overcome. It remains to be seen whether, in the Canadian context, 
ALPR can overcome the political and organizational challenges to its full deployment.         
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Appendix A:  List of Parking Lots 
 
Whalley Area Parking Lots 
-Scott Rd. Sky Train Station- 124
th
 & 110
th 
 (20-30 min) (10 min →  
            
-Scott Towne Plaza- Back onto Scott Rd., left at 96
th
 & Scott, and turn right into this lot. 
(5 min)(5 min → 
 
-Cedar Hill‟s Plaza- Back onto 96th, right on 128th, and left into this plaza. (10 min)  
(10 min → 
 
-Days Inn-Right on 96
th
, left onto KG HWY, right into this lot, turn to right parking lot, 
then right again to Days Inn Lot. (20 min) (no travel time to next lot) 
 
-KG HWY Sky Train Station- Drive straight back from the Days Inn Parking lot to Sky 
Train lot. (5 min) (5 min → 
 
-Central City Mall- Right onto KG HWY, left into this mall parking lot. (40 min) (no 
travel time to next lot) 
 
-Surrey Central Sky Train Station & North Surrey Rec Center- Turn right onto Old Yale 
Rd., right on 134 A St., right on 102, and turn into this lot. (5 min) 
 
-Park & Ride Lots and Rec Center Lots- Right on 102, right into these lots. (5 min) (5 
min → 
 
-Canada Safeway- left onto 102 ave, left on 135 St., right into this lot. (10 min)  
(10 min → 
 
-North Gate Shopping Center- Exit onto 135  Right to 104 and on 104 and continue to 
Northgate (Dell).(10 min) (10 min  
 
-Canadian Tire and Price Smart- right on East Whalley Ring Rd., through 104 and right 
into this lot. (10 min) (10 min → 
 
Guildford Area Parking Lots 
-Guildford Mall (North Parking Lot) - Left on E. Whalley Ring , R on 104, left on 150
th
, 
right into Guildford Mall. (15 min) (no travel time to next location) 
 
-Guildford Rec Center- Go straight back to this parking lot from the Guildford Mall 
North Parking Lot. (5 min) (5 min → 
 
-Guildford Mall (Enter by Sears)- Right on Lincoln Drive, right on 152, right on 105, left 
into this lot. (10 min) (5 min→ 
  
-Guildford Mall (By Old Navy) - Right on 152, right into Guildford Town Center by Old 
Navy. (30 min) (35 min → 
 
South Surrey Area Parking Lots 
-South Pointe Mall- Right on 152 to this mall. (10 min) (10 min→ 
 
-Semiahmoo Mall- Right on 152, right onto 17
th
 (at the lights) and into the mall parking 
lot. (30 min) (10 min→ 
 
-South Surrey Park & Ride- Right on KG HWY, right into this lot. (10 min) (30 min → 
 
Newton Area Parking Lots 
-Strawberry Hill Mall (122
nd
 & 72
nd
) - Right on 72
nd
, and right into this lot. (35 min) (10 
min → 
 
-Walmart- Scott Rd turn right on 88
th
 (Nordell), turn left into this lot. (10 min) (10 min → 
 
-Costco- Left onto 88, to KG HWY right , and right into Costco. (15 min) (5 min → 
 
-Kings Cross (superstore mall) - Exit the same way and right onto KG HWY to 74th, and 
turn into this lot. (10 min) (5 min → 
 
Evening Routes 
-Dolphin Pub (7115 138 St.) & Hollywood 3 Cinemas (7125 138 St.)- Exit in front of 
Office Depot left onto 74 Ave, Right on 138 St, through 72 ave and turn right into 
Safeway mall. (10 min) (10 min → 
 
-Cineplex Odeon (Strawberry Hills-12161 72 Ave.)-Left on 138 at the lights, left on 72
nd
, 
right at 122 or 123 into Strawberry Hill Mall- 12161 72
nd
)(30 min) (15 min → 
 
-The Dell- KG HWY & 107
th-  
Right on Scott Rd  to 96 Ave right to KGH left to this mall 
(entrance at approx 106 ave & KGH) (10 min) (10 min → 
 
-The Mirage (15330 102A Ave) – Exit the Dell by East Whalley ring road right to 104 
Ave, left to 152 St, right to 102 and turn left. Mirage is on the right at 154.  
(5 min) (5 min →  
 
-Empire Theatre - Left on 102, straight across 152 into Guildford Town Center to access 
Empire theatres. (10 min) 
 
  
 
Appendix B:  ALPR Coding Form 
Date Time 
(24 hrs) 
Location Direction 
of Target 
Direction 
of 
PC 
Nature of 
Hit 
Read 
License 
Plate 
Actual License 
Plate 
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
  
Appendix C:  Locations of Top Five Parking Lots 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
